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Introduction
On October 13, 2011, a van struck a two-year-old girl named Yue Yue
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on a side street in Guangdong.1  At least eighteen people passed by indiffer-
ently, leaving Yue Yue lying on the ground, seriously injured.2  A second
van came and struck the girl again; she died the next morning.3  A surveil-
lance camera captured this incident and the video was aired on television
and posted on websites.4  The indifference of those bystanders shocked the
public, and thousands of people left comments questioning the morality in
Chinese society.5
One possible reason for this tragedy is that China, unlike many other
countries, does not have a “Good Samaritan” law.  A Good Samaritan law
is one that encourages citizens to aid strangers in need through various
legal incentives.  Globally, there are two common groups of Good Samari-
tan laws.  Civil law countries such as France, Spain, and Germany, as well
as some U.S. states, impose a “duty to rescue” that punishes those who fail
to assist people in danger or to report to authorities.6  Others do not
impose such a duty to rescue but instead have statutes that shield the res-
cuer from liability.7
This Note will address the Good Samaritan problems in China by
answering three questions.8  First, why, from a legal perspective, were the
bystanders so indifferent to the injured girl on the street?  Second, how did
a series of cases scare people away from acting as the Good Samaritan and
cause the low morality in the Chinese society?  Third, how do other coun-
tries or jurisdictions legislate and enforce Good Samaritan laws to deal
with the problem?  To answer these questions, I will compare Good Samari-
tan laws in various jurisdictions, with a specific focus on several European
civil law jurisdictions that enforce a duty to rescue.  I will also compare
Good Samaritan laws in varying jurisdictions in the United States.  Finally,
I will analyze whether China needs to enact a Good Samaritan law and, if
so, what is most appropriate for the current Chinese society.
Although China is a civil law country, several sensational lawsuits
actually “embittered the public toward performing heroic deeds for stran-
gers.”9  One major lawsuit occurred in 2007.10  Peng Yu, claiming himself
1. Chai Ling, Can Video of Yue Yue, a Toddler Left for Dead, Change China?, FOX
NEWS (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/10/22/can-video-yue-
yue-toddler-left-for-dead-change-china/; Wu Zhong, Little Yueyue and China’s Moral Road,
ASIAN TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2011), atimes.com/atimes/China/MJ19Ad01.html
2. Chai Ling, supra note 1. R
3. Id.
4. Wu Zhong, supra note 1. R
5. Id.
6. See discussion infra Part I.D.2
7. See discussion infra Part I.D.3
8. This Note will focus on solving the Good Samaritan problems by offering a legal
perspective.  For other solutions, such as using “the Media to Raise Civic Conscious-
ness” and implementing “Life Supporting First Aid (‘LSFA’) Training to Equip and
Encourage Helping Behavior,” see Melody W. Young, Comment, The Aftermath of Peng
Yu: Restoring Helping Behavior in China, 22 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y. J. 691, 707, 708 (2013).
9. Holly McFarland, Could a ‘Good Samaritan’ Law Help China Become More Com-
passionate?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Making-a-difference/Change-Agent/2011/1103/Could-a-Good-Samaritan-law-help-
China-become-more-compassionate.
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a Good Samaritan, helped and accompanied to the hospital Ms. Xu, a 65-
year-old woman who fell to the ground when getting off of a bus.11  Ms. Xu
returned Peng’s kindness by suing him for $7000 for medical expenses,
alleging that Peng was responsible for her injury.12  The judge held for Ms.
Xu, reasoning that Peng would not have helped Ms. Xu “unless he was
guilty of injuring her in the first place.”13
After this case, several judges in different provinces of China delivered
similar verdicts.  For example, in October 2009, Wang Xiuzhi, a 69-year-old
woman, fell and suffered multiple bone fractures after illegally jumping a
guardrail in the middle of a road.14  A man named Xu Yunhe saw the acci-
dent and got out of his car to help Ms. Wang.  Ms. Wang later sued Xu for
knocking her down from the guardrail and causing her injuries.15  Without
determining that Xu actually hit Ms. Wang, the court found Xu 40%
responsible for the accident.16  Similarly, a man named Wu Jundong
became the subject of a lawsuit after he acted as a Good Samaritan.  On
November 23, 2010, Wu Jundong drove a three-wheeled motorcycle past
two old men riding an electric bicycle.17  When the two old men suddenly
fell from their bicycle, Wu Jundong stopped and called for help.18  The two
old men subsequently sued Wu, and both the lower and middle level
courts in the Jin Hua District held Wu responsible for 70% of the damages,
without actual evidence that Wu had caused the two old men to fall
down.19
These types of cases directly discouraged people from helping the
injured on the street and greatly affected the morale of Chinese people.  In
December 2013, China Youth Daily conducted an online poll that asked if
10. See Xu XX Su Peng Yu Ren Shen Sun Hai Pen Chang Jiu Fen An
( ) [ Xu XX v. Peng Yu, Personal Injury Compensation
Dispute], PKULAW.CN (Nanjing Mun. Gulou Dist. People’s Ct. Sept. 3, 2007) (China)
[hereinafter Peng Yu Case].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. McFarland, supra note 9. R
14. To Help or Not to Help?, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 26, 2011, 3:13 PM), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-08/26/content_13199786.htm.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Shi Zhaoshi Hai Shi Zuo Haoshi? Wu Jundong Fuqi Shuaidao Laoren Bei Pan Pei 7
Wan ( ) [Was He Responsible for the
Accident or a Good Samaritan? Wu Jundong Was Held Responsible for 70,000 RMB for
Helping Falling Old Men], ZHEJIANG NEWS ( ) (Nov. 29, 2011), http://zjnews.zjol.
com.cn/05zjnews/system/2011/11/29/018034196.shtml.
18. Id.
19. Id.  In some other cases Good Samaritans were not held liable but only because
security videos proved their innocence. See e.g., Luo Wei, Camera Dispels Woman’s Post
Accident Fault Claims, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://
www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/673199/Camera-dispels-womans-post-acci-
dent-fault-claims.aspx (describing how an elderly woman accused a bus driver of hitting
her, but video surveillance footage showed that a pedicab knocked her over and that the
bus driver was there to help).
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people would be willing to help a collapsed elderly person on the street.20
Approximately 56% of the 139,010 participants said that they would not
offer help for fear of extortion, while only 5.4% would be willing to offer
assistance without hesitation.21
Good Samaritan laws are important to society because anyone could
find themselves in Yue Yue’s situation one day and in need of assistance
from strangers.  Thus, rather than simply casting blame on those people
who indifferently passed by, societies must provide legal solutions to
encourage people to help strangers on the street in these times of need.
First, the defective and erroneous reasoning underpinning verdicts in cases
such as the Peng Yu Case and Xu Yunhe Case must be recognized and
resolved.22  Second, China, like many other jurisdictions around the world,
should enact Good Samaritan statutes to encourage its citizens to aid peo-
ple in danger.  There are two types of Good Samaritan laws existing in
European and American jurisdictions.  Civil law countries such as France,
Spain, and Germany, as well as several states in the United States, have in
place a “duty to rescue” statute that punishes people who fail to assist peo-
ple in danger or to report to authorities.23  Alternatively, most U.S. states
do not impose a general duty to rescue and instead have Good Samaritan
statutes that provide various levels of immunity to shield rescuers from
incurring liability.24
In Part I, this Note will point out the defective reasoning behind the
Peng Yu Case and Xu Yunhe Case and introduce various types of Good
Samaritan laws in different jurisdictions.  In Part II, this Note will analyze
why the defective reasoning behind the Peng Yu Case and Xu Yunhe Case
pushed people away from aiding others, and by comparative study, locate
the most appropriate Good Samaritan laws to employ for today’s Chinese
society.  This Part will also examine recent legislative developments regard-
ing Good Samaritan issues in China.  The Note concludes with the recom-
mendation that China implement a Good Samaritan law and enforce a
duty to rescue, with goals of reshaping both Chinese attitudes towards
morality and potential rescuers’ fear of incurring liability.  To implement
this duty will require overcoming the flawed legal reasoning in the Peng Yu
and Xu Yunhe Cases.  Further, this Note argues that China’s ideal Good
Samaritan law must feature both a duty to rescue and a broad immunity
clause with a “gross negligence” standard of care that deters victims from
making false accusations.
20. Xiang Nan & Tang Yingyue, 84.9% Gongzhong Tan Yan Bu Fu Laoren Hen Jiujie
(84.9% ) [84.9% of the Public Said that They Would Be Hesitant
to Help Fallen Elders on the Street], CHINA YOUTH DAILY ( ) (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2013-12/10/nw.D110000zgqnb_20131210_2-07.htm.
21. Id. Poll results indicated that 55.6% of participants would ignore the accidents
and leave directly; 23.4% would offer help after finding witnesses; 12.6% would call
police; and only 5.4% would offer help without hesitation. Id.
22. See discussion infra Part II.A.
23. See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
24. See discussion infra Part I.D.3.
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I. Background
A. The Peng Yu Case Verdict
The major dispute in this case is whether Peng Yu helped Ms. Xu to the
hospital out of a sense of altruism or because he actually caused her
injury.25  Ms. Xu, the plaintiff, claimed that as she was trying to board a
bus, the defendant, Peng Yu, rushed down from the bus and knocked her
over, injuring her legs.  According to Peng Yu, however, he was the first
person to get off the bus and did not see or touch Ms. Xu at that time.26
Only after he saw Ms. Xu lying on the ground in pain did he try to help Ms.
Xu stand up and escort her to the hospital.27
The court first noted that neither party was able to provide direct evi-
dence to show who caused Ms. Xu’s injury.28  However, rather than dis-
miss the case for lack of evidence from the plaintiff’s side, the court held
that the defendant failed to provide enough evidence to “prove his inno-
cence.”29  While the defendant provided an eyewitness who testified that
he saw the defendant run to Ms. Xu and try to help her stand up, the court
reasoned that this evidence could not help the defendant’s case because the
witness had not seen how Ms. Xu got injured in the first place.30
The court then examined Peng Yu’s potential liability based on “com-
mon sense” and “experience from everyday life.”31  The court reasoned
that because Peng Yu was the first one to get off the bus that Ms. Xu was
trying to get on, it was “very likely” that Peng Yu caused her to fall down.32
The court also held that a reasonable Good Samaritan should have “caught
the person who actually caused the accident,” or waited until the victim’s
family arrived and let them send the victim to the hospital.33  Peng Yu’s
conduct— escorting Ms. Xu to the hospital— was, according to the court,
“obviously against the common sense.”34
Moreover, the court determined that Peng Yu’s failure to ask Ms. Xu to
reimburse the medical expenses he paid when he escorted her to the hospi-
tal also hurt his case.35  The court asserted that “according to common
sense,” strangers would not lend money to each other.36  Even if they
would, a reasonable person in that circumstance would at least ask disin-
terested people to act as witnesses or would ask the family of the injured
person to provide a written note describing the event.37  Also, the court
pointed out that Ms. Xu’s relatives were already at the hospital when Peng
25. See Peng Yu Case, supra note 10. R
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Yu accompanied Ms. Xu there.38  This fact made the court suspicious as to
why Peng Yu still paid part of Ms. Xu’s medical expenses, which totaled
200 RMB (about $30).39
After the court concluded that it was Peng Yu who had knocked Ms.
Xu over, it then considered whether Peng Yu was negligent in doing so.40
The court determined that because the bus door blocked Peng Yu’s line of
sight, Peng Yu’s failure to predict Ms. Xu’s movement was not unreasonable
and Peng Yu was not negligent in causing Ms. Xu’s injury.41  The court,
however, cited the “fairness principle” in Chinese tort law, which requires
courts to consider the “victim’s damages, the financial condition of both
sides, and other relevant circumstances,” to determine if the person who
caused the injury should partly compensate the victim for the resulting
damages even if the defendant was not at fault.42  Based on this principle,
the court held that Peng Yu was liable for 40% of Xu’s medical expenses
and legal fees.43  Concerning this incident, an article from China Daily
noted, “[such] ‘reasoning’ horrified, and angered, the whole nation.  From
then on, the number of pedestrians helping old people in need has dramat-
ically decreased.”44
B. The “Xu Yunhe” Case Verdict: The Second “Peng Yu” Case
Similar to the Peng Yu case, the central dispute in the Xu Yunhe Case is
whether Xu Yunhe was a Good Samaritan or caused Ms. Wang’s injury.45
Ms. Wang, the plaintiff, claimed that when she was attempting to jump
over a guardrail in the middle of a road, the defendant Xu Yunhe drove by
and hit her with his car.46  Xu Yunhe, on the other hand, argued that he
stopped his car only because he saw Ms. Wang falling from the guardrail
and wanted to offer assistance and that his car had never actually touched
Ms. Wang.47
As in the Peng Yu Case, the court specifically noted that Xu Yunhe did
not provide enough evidence to prove his innocence.48  The only evidence
that Ms. Wang provided in support of her claim was a photo showing that
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing the original text, which indicates
“
”).
43. Id.
44. Liu Shinan, Need to Protect Our Good Samaritans, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 5, 2011, 7:45
AM), http://www.chinadailycom.cn/opinion/2011-01/05/content_11794724.htm.
45. Wang Xiuzhi Su Xu Yunhe Daolu Jiaotong Renshen Sunhai Peichang Jiufen An
( ) [Wang Xiuzhi v. Xu Yunhe, Traffic
Accident Personal Injury Compensation Dispute], PKULAW.CN (Tianjin Mun. Hongqiao
Dist. People’s Ct. June 16, 2011) (China) [hereinafter Xu Yunhe Case]
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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the paint on Xu Yunhe’s car was chipped, which she argued occurred when
his car hit her.49  The police report, however, concluded that there was not
enough evidence to determine what actually caused the paint chip.  Also,
according to Xu Yunhe’s testimony and the police analysis of the scene,
there were 2.4 meters between where Ms. Wang fell off the guardrail and
where Xu Yunhe’s car stopped.50  The court, instead of finding that Ms.
Wang did not have enough evidence to support her claim, held that this
“was not enough evidence to eliminate the possibility that the defendant
did not hit the plaintiff.”51
Additionally, the court stated that it did not matter whether Xu Yunhe
had hit Ms. Wang or not.  Because the car was only several meters away
from Ms. Wang when the accident happened, she “must have been pan-
icked” and her movement “must have been influenced by the car.”52
Therefore, the court determined, regardless of whether Xu Yunhe’s car hit
Ms. Wang or not, Xu Yunhe should be partly responsible for her injury.53
The court did consider the fact that Ms. Wang had actually broken the
law by jumping the guardrail when evaluating her contributory negli-
gence.54  Still, the court held that Xu Yunhe was 40% liable for all the dam-
ages, and he was ordered to pay 108606.34 RMB (more than $15,000).55
Some commentators noted:
Such a large sum [of compensation] would transform the living conditions
of most people in society today and is likely to draw some poorer to try and
copy Wang.  Since there’s no proof of the Good Samaritan’s innocence, the
law encourages this type of extortion.  This is where it is inadequate— treat-
ing the good unfairly and leaving the true offenders unpunished.56
C. Post “Peng Yu”: Effects in Chinese Society
Many consider the Peng Yu and Xu Yunhe Cases to be “black marks on
the country’s judicial record.”57  Interestingly, however, when the Peng Yu
Case was appealed to a higher-level court, the parties agreed to settle for a
small amount of money and have the record sealed, leaving people to won-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing the original test, which indicates
“ ”).
52. Id. (citing the original test, which indicates
“
”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Sheng Chao, China Scares Off Good Samaritans, ECON. OBSERVER (Sep. 2, 2011),
http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2011/1018/213705.shtml.
57. Chris Dalby, Should Samaritan Laws Punish or Protect?, GLOBAL TIMES (Oct. 31,
2011, 9:31 PM), http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/681762/Should-
Samaritan-laws-punish-or-protect.aspx.
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der whether Peng Yu really hit Ms. Xu.58  Moreover, a state-owned maga-
zine, Oriental Weekly, revealed that in 2006, Peng Yu not only confessed to
the police that he had knocked over Ms. Xu from the bus, but also solicited
local news media to promote him as a Good Samaritan.59  However, regard-
less of the truth, these verdicts have already left the Chinese public with the
impression that Good Samaritans cannot resort to the legal system for help
when victims falsely accuse them.60
Incidents across the country in recent years reflect the negative influ-
ence of these cases.  On February 22, 2009, after a 75-year-old man fell to
the ground getting off of a bus in Nanjing, no one moved to help him.61
Desperately, the old man yelled: “It is not anybody’s fault.  I fell by
myself.”62  It was only after this declaration that he was finally offered
assistance.63  Others, unfortunately, have not been so lucky.  In Fuzhou, a
southern China city, an 83-year-old man died after falling onto “a down-
town street and lying on the cold pavement, face down, for half an hour;”
he received no help from any bystanders.64  An onlooker even went so far
as to stop two women who went to help the man, saying, “Better not touch
him.  It will be hard for you to put it clearly later on.”  Instead of helping
the man get up, the two women called the police, but the man died before
an ambulance arrived.65
A similar tragedy occurred in a residential community in Shenzhen,
Guangdong province.  Bystanders spotted a 78-year-old man lying face
down on the “rain-soaked ground.”66  None of the bystanders took any
immediate action beyond calling the police, and the man died.67  One of
the guards in the community later explained, “We dared not touch the old
man because we would not be able to put it clearly should anything unto-
ward occur.”68
A recent incident occurred in Sichuan when a 65-year-old old woman
fell down and injured her legs.69  Three children who saw the accident
happen went to help the old woman.70  However, once they approached
her, the woman grabbed one of the children and insisted that the child had
caused her injury and the child’s family should pay for all her medical
58. Adam Minter, China’s Infamous ‘Good Samaritan’ Case Gets a New Ending,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2012, 6:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-17/
china-s-infamous-good-samaritan-case-gets-a-new-endingadam-minter.html.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Liu, supra note 44. R
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Sichuan Dazhou 3 Ming Ertong Chanfu Laotai Bei E Jingfang Yi Qizha Zui Lian
( ) [Three Children Were Extorted for
Helping an Old Woman Police Started the Fraud Investigation], TENCENT NEWS ( )
(Oct. 20, 2013), http://news.qq.com/a/20131122/001702.htm.
70. Id.
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expenses.71  Since then there have even been discussions about whether
parents and schools should continue to teach children to respect and help
their elders.72
These incidents fall into two categories.  First, there are the “Peng Yu”
type of incidents in which Good Samaritans are sued by the injured party.
Second, there are the “Yue Yue” type of scenarios in which bystanders, fear-
ing liability, do not help the injured strangers.  Both types indicate that
contemporary Chinese society needs Good Samaritan laws to shield Good
Samaritans from legal liability and to encourage helping strangers who are
in danger.
D. Good Samaritan Laws Across Different Countries and Jurisdictions
The term “Good Samaritan” originated from a Bible story in which
Jesus explains who qualifies as a good neighbor.73  In that story, a man,
attacked by robbers, was lying on the ground half-dead.74  A priest and a
Levite both saw him but passed by.  Only a Samaritan went to him and
“bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine . . . [and] brought him to
an inn and took care of him.”75  Eventually, jurisdictions around the world
adopted this sentiment into their laws, and the Good Samaritan doctrine
was thus developed.  As noted earlier, different states generally adopt one
of two categories of Good Samaritan laws.76  The first category is usually
referred to as “duty-to-assist” or “duty-to-rescue” laws, which impose a gen-
eral duty to rescue and punish those who fail to lend a hand to people in
peril.77  Most European civil law jurisdictions and several U.S. states have
enacted different versions of a duty-to-rescue law.78  The second category
of Good Samaritan laws, those that immunize rescuers from potential civil
liabilities arising from “any negative result of their rescue attempt,” are
most common in the United States.79
1. History of “Duty-to-Rescue” Doctrine
Prior to the nineteenth century, few regimes or countries imposed a
71. Id.
72. See Huati: Yu Laoren Shuaidao Hai Yaobuyao Jiao Xiaohai Chanfu
( ) [Topic: Whether We Should Still Teach Children
to Help Seniors Who Fell on the Ground], SU-LONG WANG ( ) (Oct. 19, 2013), http://
www.su-long.com/contents/2013/26/340039.html.
73. Luke 10:25– 37 (New International Version), available at http://www.bible-
gateway.com/passage/?search=Luke+10%3A25-37&version=NIV.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Justin T. King, Comment, Criminal Law: “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”  Sher-
rice’s Law: A Balance of American Notions of Duty and Liability, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 613,
617– 18 (1999); see also John T. Pardun, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Per-
spective, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 591, 593 (1998).
77. Id.
78. See King, supra note 76, at 618; Pardun, supra note 76, at 594– 603; see also R
discussion infra Part I.D.2.
79. King, supra note 76, at 618; see also discussion infra Part I.D.3. R
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duty to rescue.80  In 1751, Bavaria became the first European jurisdiction
to impose a duty-to-rescue law, which applied “only in times of external
aggression.”81  In the nineteenth century, while Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ger-
many, and Russia adopted a duty-to-rescue with various limitations, France
and common law England did not.82  During World War II, the totalitarian
philosophy of Nazi Germany led to a broadening of the duty-to-rescue
law.83  When Nazi Germany occupied France during World War II, France
also passed a duty-to-rescue statute, which became one of the few statutes
that France did not repeal after Germany’s occupation ended.84  Belgium
and Austria adopted their first duty-to-rescue statutes in 1961 and 1975,
respectively, and Spain and Portugal modified their statutes to expand the
scope of the duty-to-rescue provision in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury.85  Similar to European countries, almost all Latin American countries
have enacted duty-to-rescue statutes since the end of World War II.86
Few common law jurisdictions impose a duty-to-rescue law.  For
example, England currently does not have a duty-to-rescue statute.87  In
the United States, a duty-to-rescue statute only exists in a minority of
states.88  Furthermore, even in those states that have criminal provisions
regarding a duty to rescue, the penalties are very mild.89  Moreover, none of
the states allow for a private right of action against “bad Samaritans.”90
2. Positive Duty-to-Rescue Laws in Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions
a. France
The French duty-to-rescue statute imposes criminal and civil liabilities
on a bystander who fails to render necessary help that poses no risk to
himself or any third party.91  The statute states:
Article 223-6.  Any person who willfully abstains from rendering assistance
to a person in a state of peril that necessitates immediate intervention when
he or she could have rendered that assistance without risk to himself, her-
self, or others, either by acting personally or by calling for aid, may be pun-
ished by up to five years imprisonment and a fine of up to 75,000 euro.92
80. See Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis,
11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 81– 83 (2005).
81. Id. at 82– 83.
82. Id. at 83.
83. Id. at 86.
84. Id. at 86– 87.
85. Id. at 87.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id. “The phrase ‘bad Samaritan statutes’ refers to those statutes that punish with
criminal sanction persons who fail to assist or fail to attempt to assist another in need.
Likewise, a ‘bad Samaritan’ is one who fails to assist another in need.” Id. at 78– 79 n.6.
91. Id. at 88.
92. CODE PE´NAL [C. PE´N.] art. 223-6 (Fr.).  The original text is: “Quiconque pouvant
empeˆcher par son action imme´diate, sans risque pour lui ou pour les tiers, soit un
crime, soit un de´lit contre l’inte´grite´ corporelle de la personne s’abstient volontairement
de le faire est puni de cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 75000 euros d’amende.” Id.
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The statute contains four elements to impose liability on an indifferent
bystander:93 (1) there must be a person exposed to an “imminent and con-
tinuous” danger;94 (2) the potential rescuer must have knowledge that a
person is in danger;95 (3) the potential rescuer must be capable to perform
the rescue;96 and (4) the rescue does not expose the potential rescuer or
any others to danger.97
The most striking feature of the French duty-to-rescue law is the sever-
ity of the punishment: five years of imprisonment and a fine of up to
75,000 euro.98  Moreover, such punishment is “almost always carried
out.”99  Additionally, accident victims can bring a civil law claim against a
bystander for the bystander’s failure to rescue by “simply adding the tor-
tious implications of the offence to the criminal action before the criminal
courts.”100  French courts generally determine the civil damages of failure
to rescue by considering “what might have been avoided by a reasonable
effort to rescue.”101
b. Similar Statutes in Germany, Italy, and Spain
After World War II, Germany amended its duty-to-rescue provision to
the following:
§ 323c.  Failure to Render Assistance.  Whoever does not render aid during
accidents or common danger or need, although it is required and can be
expected of him under the circumstances and, especially, is possible without
substantial danger to himself and without violation of other important
duties, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than one year or a
fine.102
Italy’s Good Samaritan statute reads:
Article 593.  Failure to help.  Whoever, finding an abandoned child of less
than ten years, or another person incapable of providing for himself through
physical or mental illness, through old age or for other cause, omits to
inform the authorities immediately, is punishable.
93. Peter M. Agulnick & Heidi V. Rivkin, Comment, Criminal Liability for Failure to
Rescue: A Brief Survey of French and American Law, 8 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 93, 110 (1998).
94. Id. at 111.  A dead person is not in a danger and will not trigger a duty to rescue.
Id.
95. Id. at 111– 12.  To illustrate, a defendant who did not know that an elderly man
he encountered was stuck in a wall was not criminally liable for not offering help. Id.
96. Id. at 112– 13.  For instance, a non-swimmer bystander does not have the duty to
rescue a drowning person. Id.
97. Id. at 113– 14.  For example. a defendant who extinguished flames on his car
first before assisting the mechanic fixing his car was not criminally liable because a
burning car posed greater danger. Id.
98. Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave
a Victim Lying in the Street?  What is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive
Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 371 (1999).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 354.
101. Id.
102. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 323c (Ger.); Schiff, supra note 80, at R
88.
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The same penalty may be imposed on one who, finding a human corpse or a
person who appears to be dead, or an injured person or a person in danger,
omits to give immediate assistance or to inform the authorities without
delay.103
Spain’s current Good Samaritan provision reads:
489 bis.  He who does not help a person who finds himself unprotected and
in manifest and grave danger, when he could help without risk to himself or
to another, shall be punished with major arrest or a fine . . . .104
c. United States
Despite a general absence of duty-to-rescue laws in American jurisdic-
tions, as of 2009, ten states have enacted statutes imposing a duty to rescue
or to report to authorities.105  Interestingly, while each state emphasizes
different circumstances in which a duty to rescue is implicated, the com-
mon theme among these states is that their statutes are hardly ever
enforced.106
Minnesota’s duty to rescue statute provides that:
A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is
exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the
person can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person.  Reasonable assistance may include
obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical per-
sonnel.  A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor.107
Similar to the European countries’ duty-to-rescue statutes, the Minne-
sota statute requires that the harm be serious in nature and states that the
rescuer will be excused from liability if providing aid “would subject the
rescuer or others to danger.”108  However, unlike in France where the pun-
ishments for failing to exercise a duty-to-rescue are frequently carried out,
in Minnesota, there have been no “known arrests or prosecutions under
this provision” since the statute’s enactment in 1983.109
Vermont was the first state in the United States to enact a duty-to-
rescue statute.110  It reads:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to
103. C.p. aprile 2003 n. 593 (It.); Schiff, supra note 80, at 89– 90. R
104. C.P., n. 489, Nov. 1995 (Spain); Schiff, supra note 80, at 90. R
105. Eugene Volokh, Duty to Rescue/Report Statutes, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 3,
2009, 12:24 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty-to-rescuereport-statutes/
(reporting that as of 2009, ten states, including California, Florida, Hawaii, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, have
enacted statutes that impose a duty to rescue crime victims, assist a person suffering
from grave physical harm, or report the crime to authorities).
106. Pardun, supra note 76, at 596– 97. R
107. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2013).
108. Pardun, supra note 76, at 598. R
109. Id. at 597.
110. Id. at 598.
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himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others . . . .  (c) A person who willfully violates subsection
(a) of this section shall be fined not more than $100.00.111
The only occasion when the Supreme Court of Vermont has interpreted
this statute was in State v. Joyce,112 where the court ruled that Vermont’s
duty-to-rescue law “does not create a duty to intervene in a fight” because
“[s]uch a situation [ ] present[s] [a] ‘danger or peril’ to the rescuer” and
therefore “the statute prevents a duty from arising.”113  Aside from this
case where the court narrowly interpreted the statute, Vermont’s duty-to-
rescue law is rarely utilized.114  Also, because the only penalty is a fine up
to $100, as indicated by the statute, confusion arises as to whether the
statute is “civil or criminal in nature.”115  As a one commentator indicated,
“[o]n paper, at least, Vermont has made history, but the statute’s practical
effect remains to be seen.”116
Rhode Island has some of the harshest penalties for failure to provide
aid to someone in danger.  Section 11-56-1 of Rhode Island’s General Laws
provides that
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is
exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he
or she can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others,
give reasonable assistance to the exposed person.  Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor and shall be
subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months or by a fine
of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.117
This penalty is still not comparable, however, to the even harsher penalties
enforced by the French Good Samaritan law.
In the mid-1980s, Wisconsin enacted a duty-to-assist statute.118  Com-
pared to other jurisdictions’ statutes, Wisconsin’s duty-to-rescue statute
does not require a general duty to rescue victims of any accident, but only
a duty to “report a crime or aid a victim of crime.”119  Similar to other U.S.
jurisdictions that impose a duty to rescue, Wisconsin rarely applies its
duty to rescue statute in practice.120  As Judge and former Professor Mel-
ody Stewart summarized, the duty-to-rescue statutes in the United States
“are examples of laws easily made but . . . not [ ] enforced with any degree
of regularity or consistency.”121
111. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2012).
112. 433 A.2d 271, 273 (Vt. 1981).
113. Id.
114. Pardun, supra note 76, at 599. R
115. Id. at 599 & n.52 (“The unique character of the Vermont approach is a blend of
a civil exemption with a criminal penalty.”).
116. Id. at 599.
117. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2012).
118. Pardun, supra note 76, at 599. R
119. Id. at 600.
120. Id.
121. Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An
Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 424 (1998).
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3. “Good Samaritan” Immunity Clause
While civil law jurisdictions usually do not have an immunity clause
in their Good Samaritan statutes, common law jurisdictions generally pro-
vide statutory immunity to rescuers from potential liability.122
a. Civil Law Jurisdictions
Although civil law jurisdictions usually do not codify Good Samaritan
immunity, courts there protect potential rescuers by applying a “totality of
the circumstances” test.123  For example, in France and other civil law
jurisdictions, courts might consider “the urgency of the situation requiring
rescue” and excuse actions that might otherwise constitute negligence.124
b. United States
Aimed at encouraging prompt assistance for emergency victims by
eliminating the fear of legal liability, every state in the United States has
enacted an immunity clause to shield rescuers from liability.125  However,
the scope of these immunity clauses varies in two major areas: the standard
of care required and the class of people who are protected.
c. Standard of Care
Professor Victoria Sutton conducted a fifty-state survey analyzing the
immunity clauses nationwide.126  Professor Sutton found “five levels of
conditions for avoiding liability, and accordingly, ‘one’ provides the best
conditions for avoiding liability and encouraging rescue, and  ‘five’ is the
least conducive to encouraging rescue by private individuals.”127  Unfortu-
nately, Professor Sutton is not very clear as to the distinctions of the five
levels.  Careful reading of the statutes of each state and Professor Sutton’s
five-level theory shows that there are actually three distinguishable levels of
the standard of care.128
122. See Schiff, supra note 80, at 109. R
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Victoria Sutton, Is There A Doctor (and a Lawyer) in the House? Why Our Good
Samaritans Laws Are Doing More Harm than Good for a National Public Health Security
Strategy: A Fifty-State Survey, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 261, 261 (2010).
127. Id. at 282.
128. Sutton identified five levels regarding the standard of care.  The first level of stan-
dard of care is good faith; the second level requires good faith unless the acts are “willful
and wanton” or “reckless;” the third level asks whether the acts constituted “some level of
negligence,” such as “gross negligence and willful and wanton;” the fourth level uses
“gross negligence” to deny immunity, which according to the author, is “barely above”
ordinary negligence; and the fifth level uses the standard of common law ordinary negli-
gence. See id. at 283– 86.  However, “gross negligence” has sometimes been defined as
“reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct.” See Mia I. Frieder, Can You Lift the Good
Samaritan Shield?, 46 TRIAL 48, 50 (2010).  Therefore, it is relatively hard to differentiate
levels two, three, and four.  For the purpose of this Note, I combine levels two, three, and
four together as level two, and what is called level five in Sutton’s article will be level
three in this Note.
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According to Professor Sutton, the first-level states “provide the great-
est incentive to the Good Samaritan.”129  These states simply use “good
faith” as the standard that caregivers must meet to avoid liability.130  As
Professor Sutton points out, of all of the levels of standards of care, “[g]ood
faith is the lowest, or easiest, standard to meet.”  The good faith standard
does not require the caregiver to exercise any level of care as long as they
acted with good faith, thereby doing the most to encourage emergency
rescues.131
Second-level states do not extend immunity to acts that constitute
gross negligence or reckless, wanton, or intentional misconduct.132  Some
states, such as Texas and New Hampshire, still have a “good faith” require-
ment for any act to qualify for Good Samaritan immunity, while other
states, such as Delaware and Alaska, do not.133  However, all these states’
Good Samaritan immunity clauses require that civil liabilities not be
excused for conduct that was grossly negligent, reckless, willful and wan-
ton, or intentional.134  An example of gross negligence that would result in
disqualification for Good Samaritan protection is fraternity members who
pushed a “fraternity pledge to drink excessively,” and upon realizing the
pledge’s “perilous condition,” failed to take him to a hospital after render-
ing some emergency care.135
Third-level states adopt a negligence standard and “provide no addi-
tional immunity [other] than what is available at common law.”136
Existing in “[a] small minority of jurisdictions,” this standard does not give
a Good Samaritan immunity “unless he or she acted with ‘ordinary pru-
dence’ when exercising emergency care.”137  In other words, these statutes
merely codify the common law.
d. Class of Persons Protected
According to Professor Sutton’s fifty-state survey, states differentiate
between the various levels of immunity that rescuers of different training
129. Sutton, supra note 126, at 282. R
130. Id. These states include Alabama, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-332 (2010); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12B (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 76, § 5 (West 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (2010); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15
(2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.48 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-120 (2010).
131. Sutton, supra note 126, at 282. R
132. See id. at 283– 86. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(d) (2012) (does not pre-
clude civil damages for acts constituting “gross negligence or reckless or intentional mis-
conduct”); DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 16, § 6801(a) (2010) (no immunity if victim’s injury
was caused “willfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence” on the part of the
rescuer).
133. See Sutton, supra note 126, at 283– 85. R
134. See id. Sometimes, “[g]ross negligence has been defined as ‘reckless, willful, or
wanton misconduct.’”  Frieder, supra note 128, at 50. R
135. Id.; see, e.g., Ballou v. Sigma Nu Gen. Fraternity, 352 S.E.2d 488, 497– 98 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1986); see also Sutton, supra note 126, at 283– 86. R
136. Sutton, supra note 126, at 286. R
137. Frieder, supra note 128, at 50. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-1\CIN107.txt unknown Seq: 16  3-JUN-14 15:44
220 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
backgrounds receive.138  The state of Idaho provides the broadest protec-
tion to Good Samaritans in this respect: “Idaho does not require ‘Good
Samaritans’ to be licensed physicians,” and its immunity clause is “broad
enough to cover any person who stops at the scene of an accident and
renders emergency medical care to another.”139
Other states only provide immunity to people who are qualified.  In
these states, only individuals with “statutorily required health care training
or certification” will receive immunity “for being a Good Samaritan in a
public health emergency.”140  Private individuals with no such background
will be exposed to liability for their negligence in assisting or rescuing the
injured, “even if their actions are conducted in good faith.”141
Some states provide “specific immunity” to people with training.  For
example, four states provide immunity to “health care-related graduate stu-
dents.”142  Twenty-four states provide immunity for “physicians rendering
emergency care in a hospital.”143
II. Analysis
A. The Main Defects in the “Peng Yu Case” and “Xu Yunhe Case”
Verdicts
The facts of the Peng Yu- and Xu Yunhe-type cases are not typical
Good Samaritan cases contemplated by statutes in Europe and the United
States, where the defendants have either refused to aid a victim or have
aided a victim with some level of negligence.  In both the Peng Yu Case and
the Xu Yunhe Case, the defendant claimed that he helped the injured vic-
tim out of the goodness of his heart; however, both victims insisted that
these “Good Samaritans” were the people who injured them.144  Although
neither case is a typical “Bad Samaritan”145 case, the defects in the verdicts
in each created the impression in Chinese society that the law allows vic-
tims to falsely accuse Good Samaritans as a means to recover monetary
damages.146  The name “Peng Yu” has developed a stigma, leading many
Chinese citizens to believe that lending aid to injured people might bring
about serious legal consequences.147  The reasoning of these cases is defec-
tive in two major ways: first, instead of requiring the plaintiffs to provide
enough evidence to prove a prima facie case of negligence, each court
required the defendants to provide evidence to prove their non-culpabil-
138. Sutton, supra note 126, at 272– 76. R
139. Id. at 276.
140. Id. at 272.
141. Id. These states include California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Loui-
siana, Missouri, and Oregon. Id.
142. Id. The four states are Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, and Michigan. Id.
143. Id. at 273.
144. See Peng Yu Case, supra note 10; Xu Yunhe Case, supra note 45. R
145. See supra note 90. R
146. See Sheng Chao, supra note 56. R
147. See Wang Fan, In China, a Good Samaritan is Hard to Find, ECNS (Sep. 7, 2011,
2:56 PM), http://www.ecns.cn/in-depth/2011/09-07/2252.shtml.
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ity,148 and second, the courts in both cases reached a conclusion based on
speculation instead of actual evidence.149
With regard to the first defect, it was unreasonable for both courts to
put the burden of proof on the defendants.  Chinese tort law systems have
four basic principles for the imputation of tort liability: “fault,” “presump-
tion of fault,” “liability without fault,” and “liability on the basis of fair-
ness.”150  In Chinese tort law, “fault” is “the [foremost] factor in
determining whether the wrongdoer should bear . . . liability” and for eval-
uating how to distribute tort liability among the parties according to the
degree of their fault.151  On the other hand, “presumption of fault” supple-
ments the general principle of “fault” and requires that in certain circum-
stances stipulated by law, civil liability shall be assumed unless the
wrongdoer proves the absence of fault.152  According to Professor Mo
Zhang, “[a] major difference between fault and presumption of fault is the
burden of proof.”153  The “fault” principle requires the plaintiff to bear the
burden of proof, while in the case of “presumption of fault,” fault is pre-
sumed and the defendant bears the burden to rebut such presumption with
sufficient evidence.154  Chinese tort law applies the “presumption of fault”
principle in certain contexts.155  For example, Chinese tort law states that
if a domestic animal caused harm to a person, the owner of such domestic
animal presumes fault unless the harm was caused by the victim’s inten-
tional misconduct or gross negligence.156  Another example of presump-
tion of fault is that when falling objects from a building cause damage, the
owner or manager of the building presumes fault for purposes of tort liabil-
ity.157  However, Chinese tort law never indicates in situations like the
148. See discussion supra Part I.A– B; see also Young, supra note 8, at 697– 99 (pointing R
out that the two defects in the Peng Yu Case are that first, the judge “placed an undue
burden on the defendant to prove his innocence; and second, that the judge improperly
used “personal experience as evidence of culpability”).
149. See id.
150. Mo Zhang, Tort Liabilities and Torts Law: The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Hori-
zon, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 415, 432 (2011).
151. Zhang Lihong, The Latest Developments in the Codification of Chinese Civil Law,
83 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1027 (2009).
152. See Zhonghua Renmin Guohe Guo Qinquan Zeren Fa ( )
[Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 6 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm., Nat’l People Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) [hereinafter
Chinese Tort Liability Law]; see also Mo Zhang, supra note 150, at 437. R
153. Mo Zhang, supra note 150, at 437. R
154. Id.
155. See Zhang Lihong, supra note 151, at 1027. R
156. Id.; see also Chinese Tort Liability Law art. 78 (citing the original text, which
indicates
“
”) (emphasis
added).
157. See Zhang Lihong, supra note 151, at 1027; see also Chinese Tort Liability Law R
art. 85 (citing the original text, which indicates
“
”) (emphasis
added).
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Peng Yu Case— where the plaintiff alleged that Peng Yu pushed her to the
ground— or the Xu Yunhe Case— where the plaintiff alleged that Xu Yunhe’s
car hit her— that fault should be presumed and hence the burden of proof
shifted to the defendant.158  Therefore, the plaintiffs in both cases should
have had the burden of proving a prime facie case that the defendants were
liable.
Instead, the judges in both cases emphasized that the defendants
needed to provide evidence to prove their non-culpability.159  In the Peng
Yu Case, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence to prove her claim, while
the defendant provided the only witness.  That witness testified that he did
not see why the plaintiff fell to the ground but that he saw the defendant
run to the plaintiff and try to help the plaintiff to stand up.160  However,
the judge considered this testimony to be of little probative value, because
it could not eliminate the possibility that the defendant assaulted the plain-
tiff.  In other words, the testimony did not help the defendant prove that he
was not liable.161  In the Xu Yunhe Case, the only evidence the plaintiff
provided to support her allegation that the defendant’s car hit her was a
photo showing that the paint on the defendant’s car was chipped.162  The
police report concluded that the distance between where the plaintiff fell
off the guardrail and the defendant’s car was 2.4 meters, and that the photo
itself could not prove that the paint was chipped because the defendant’s
car hit a person.163  However, the court read the police report not to show
that the plaintiff did not have enough evidence to support her allegations,
but instead to show that “there was not enough evidence to eliminate the
possibility that the defendant did not hit the plaintiff.”164  Moreover, the
court specifically noted that the defendant “did not provide any evidence”
to prove his innocence.165
The judges in both cases reached their final conclusions based on
speculation, rather than on actual evidence.  In the Peng Yu Case, as law
student Melody Young analyzed in a published Comment, the court
improperly used “personal experience as evidence of culpability”.166  As
discussed in Part I, the court reasoned that because Peng Yu was the first
one getting off the bus that the plaintiff was trying to get onto, it was “very
likely” that the defendant caused the plaintiff to fall to the ground.167
Moreover, the court reached the conclusion that Peng Yu must have hit Ms.
Xu by pointing out that Peng Yu’s conduct— escorting Ms. Xu to the hospi-
tal and never asking Ms. Xu or her family to return the medical expenses
he paid— was against “common sense.”  As Melody Young summarized, the
158. See generally Chinese Tort Liability Law, supra note 152. R
159. See Peng Yu Case, supra note 10; Xu Yunhe Case, supra note 45. R
160. See Peng Yu Case, supra note 10. R
161. See id.
162. Xu Yunhe Case, supra note 45. R
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Young, supra note 8, at 698– 99. R
167. Peng Yu Case, supra note 10. R
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court “found that Peng’s altruism was evidence of his culpability.”168  Simi-
lar reasoning appears in the verdict of the Xu Yunhe Case.  As discussed
above, the police report showed that there were 2.4 meters between where
the defendant’s car stopped and where the plaintiff fell off the guardrail
and that the only evidence the plaintiff provided could not prove that the
defendant’s car hit the plaintiff.169  However, using “common sense,” the
court reasoned that regardless of whether the defendant’s car hit the plain-
tiff, the defendant’s car must have disturbed the plaintiff and caused her to
fall down the guardrail, as the car was only several meters away from the
plaintiff when the accident happened.170  Both verdicts show that even
though the plaintiffs did not provide any actual evidence, judges were will-
ing to use speculative reasoning to pin responsibility on the defendants.
Both cases have had significant negative influence on the morale of
Chinese society.  Both verdicts give the public the impression that the
courts do not spend time finding the “truth” of what happened; rather, the
courts concoct reasons to make a “Good Samaritan” responsible for a “vic-
tim’s” injuries.  More importantly, both verdicts give the wrong signal to
the public, teaching people that if they want to help an injured stranger on
the road, they must carry the risk of being held responsible for the stran-
ger’s injury, unless they happen to have evidence to prove their innocence—
perhaps in the form of a video camera nearby to record the incident or
witnesses willing to come forth and tell the truth.  Moreover, media reports
have reinforced the public’s hesitancy to help strangers in danger.171  At
the same time as reports about the Yue Yue incidents evoked public emo-
tion to promote public conscience, overwhelming media reports about the
injustice of the Peng Yu case and the Xu Yunhe case portrayed the Chinese
justice system as unreliable and caused the public to alter its behavior to
avoid liability.172  Although Oriental Weekly revealed in 2012 that Peng Yu
might not be the “martyred Good Samaritan” that the media depicted,173
the verdict based on flawed reasoning, combined with the effects of the
media, has already delivered a devastating message to the public: the law
will not help Good Samaritans.
Whether Good Samaritan laws are necessary and what kind of Good
Samaritan laws are appropriate notwithstanding, Chinese judges need to
follow the law’s requirement regarding the burden of proof and base their
reasoning on actual evidence rather than speculation.  It is well established
in Chinese tort law that the burden of proving fault is only shifted to the
defendant in certain enumerated situations.174  Reforming the Chinese
legal system is a topic beyond the scope of this Note.  If a Good Samaritan
law is enacted, however, the law should specify that in situations where
168. Young, supra note 8, at 698. R
169. Xu Yunhe Case, supra note 45. R
170. Id.
171. Young, supra note 8, at 705. R
172. Id.
173. Minter, supra note 58. R
174. Zhang Lihong, supra note 151, at 1027. R
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victims allege that a Good Samaritan actually caused the victim’s injuries,
these plaintiff-victims should carry the burden of proof and must provide
enough evidence to prove fault.
B. Are Good Samaritan Laws Right for China?
To remedy the negative impact of the Peng Yu Case and to encourage
people to help strangers in need, it is necessary for the Chinese legal sys-
tem to adopt Good Samaritan laws.  This question remains: what sort of
Good Samaritan laws are right for China?
1. Duty to Rescue
a. Whether a Duty to Rescue is Desirable
China should adopt a law to enforce a duty to rescue in response to
the public’s reluctance to help injured people like Yue Yue.  Here, a univer-
sally applicable duty-to-rescue law is most desirable because more “lives
would be saved and [more] injuries [would be] avoided.”175  As one legal
scholar argues, “[t]he existence of a duty would encourage rescues in four
subtly different ways:”
[M]any people would act out of a desire to be law abiding; others would act
out of fear of legal sanctions, particularly when witnesses were present;
some who are timid would be provided with the necessary motivation to
intervene; and still others would be moved to action by a heightened sense of
the morality of rescue.176
While the first three points address the direct effects of enforcing a law, the
last point is based on the idea that “law not only reflects society’s moral
values, but also helps shape them.”177  In other words, a duty-to-rescue law
could provide a sort of “moral compass” that guides Chinese society in the
right direction.  One might be worried about the practicality of a duty-to-
rescue statute because similar statutes are largely dormant in the few
American states that enforce such a duty.  However, as Professor Mary Ann
Glendon writes, “[t]he social effects of such legislation cannot be expected
to be direct, or immediate, or dramatic . . . .  [L]aw . . . is regarded by many
citizens as a principal carrier of the few common values that are widely
shared.  Under such circumstances, even the silences of the law can some-
times speak.”178  Therefore, regardless of its effect, a law to enforce the
duty to rescue would serve as an instrument of moral guidance in the Chi-
nese society and increase the likelihood that people be “morally compelled
to offer emergency aid.”179  It delivers a message to the public that the law
wants every person to be a Good Samaritan under certain circumstances,
such as that the person is capable to render aid and the assistance will not
175. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 423, 428– 29 (1985).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Mary Ann Glendon, Does the United States Need “Good Samaritan” Laws?, 1
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY. 9, 11 (1991).
179. Silver, supra note 175, at 429. R
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subject anyone to additional danger.180  Such a law would tell all the
bystanders who witnessed Yue Yue’s accident that law requires them to
help injured strangers.
Many scholars have advanced arguments against the duty-to-rescue
law.181  Although no scholar disputes the need to rescue, the issue is
“whether such a duty places too great a burden on personal freedom or
presents insurmountable administrative difficulties.”182
One argument against the duty-to-rescue law is based on the distinc-
tion between commission and omission.183  Criticisms posit that imposing
a duty to rescue is to require “the performance of affirmative acts” and is
coerced benevolence.  In other words, failure to rescue is within the con-
cept of “omission” and an omission should not be punished.184  However,
“the distinction between acts of commission and those of omission is
meaningless,” especially when the acts of omission also lead to undesirable
results.185  For example, no one would argue that a mother who intention-
ally starves her child is less morally culpable than a mother who intention-
ally poisons her child “simply because starvation is an act of omission.”186
Moreover, omissions have been a basis of liability in legal systems for a
long time.187  For instance, in the American legal system, long-established
punishable omissions include “failure to file one’s tax return, to stop at a
red light, or to install required safety devices in one’s factory . . . .”188
Another related concern regarding the imposition of a duty-to-rescue
law is that assisting people in danger is traditionally considered to be a
moral duty, and it may be argued that the government should not coerce
kindness.189  However, as discussed above, legislation has a symbolic func-
tion in society and can serve as a form of moral guidance.  Seeing how the
Peng Yu case and Xu Yunhe case have left the public with the impression
that the justice system will not help the Good Samaritan and have thereby
scared Chinese people away from aiding strangers,190 relying on the public
conscience alone apparently cannot solve the Bad Samaritan problems in
China.  Without guidance, there will be more and more Yue Yues lying on
the ground with no one to help.  For the sake of restoring the public con-
science, a duty-to-rescue” law is necessary to establish new social norms.
Another argument against the duty to rescue relates to the practical
concern that it is nearly impossible to determine whom the laws should be
180. See supra notes 93– 97 and accompanying text. R
181. See Silver, supra note 175, at 429– 34. R
182. Id. at 429.
183. Id. at 429– 30.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 430.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See supra pp. 220– 223.
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enforced against.191  In some situations, there may have been a large num-
ber of people who were equally in the best position to help but simply did
not.  In Yue Yue’s accident, for example, at least eighteen bystanders saw
her lying on the road, severely injured, but did nothing.192  In that case, a
security camera caught some of the bystanders on tape,193 but, in most
cases, the police are not able to identify everyone who could have helped
but did not.  Therefore, two questions arise, the first of which is: Whom
should the police prosecute? Should one indifferent bystander be charged
with breaking a Good Samaritan law, while seventeen equally culpable peo-
ple escape liability?  Professor A.D. Woozley denies the importance of these
types of concerns.194  He argues that such “selective enforcement”
problems happen often in the legal system.195  According to Professor
Woozley, certain analogous situations are inherently selective, such as
street riots, illegal demonstrations, and speeding.196  The police can usu-
ally stop only one rioter, illegal demonstrator, or speeding driver while
many others escape.197  However, even though “[t]he unlucky driver can
lament that he was the one who was caught,” he cannot deny the fact that
he committed the crime and is thereby subject to punishment.198  The
same logic could apply to violations of duty-to-rescue laws.199
b. Type of Liability
Having determined that a legal duty to rescue is necessary to solve the
Bad Samaritan problem in China, one must next determine the type of
punishment that should be imposed on offenders.  China’s duty-to-rescue
law would benefit most from a strong and well-publicized criminal penalty
that could provide a real deterrent to non-rescuers.  European civil law
countries and American states that enforce a duty to rescue mostly charge
offenders with criminal liabilities.200  The criminal sanctions in these sys-
tems range in severity from the French penalty of imprisonment for up to
five years and a fine of 75,000 euro to the Vermont penalty of a fine not
exceeding $100.201  As discussed in Part I, the criminal liabilities imposed
by the duty-to-rescue laws in states such as Vermont, Wisconsin, and Min-
nesota are almost negligible and the laws are rarely enforced.202  On the
other hand, French duty-to-rescue laws, harsh with respect to their criminal
191. See A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1273, 1290 (1983).
192. Chai Ling, supra note 1. R
193. Id.
194. See Woozley, supra note 191, at 1291. R
195. Id. at 1290– 91.
196. Id. at 1291.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Silver, supra note 175, at 437– 38. R
201. See CODE PE´NAL [C. PE´N] art. 223-6 (Fr.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2012).
202. See Pardun, supra note 76, at 597; Groninger, supra note 98, at 371– 72. R
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liabilities, have been enforced frequently since their enactment in 1941.203
Unlike Vermont, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, where Bad Samaritan acci-
dents have rarely happened in recent years, China needs the Good Samari-
tan statute to change the morality in the society given recent incidents.
Therefore, criminal liability, even if not as harsh as French law imposes,
should be strong enough to ensure that the duty will be taken seriously.
Some jurisdictions, such as France, also impose civil liabilities on Bad
Samaritans.204  In France, besides the harsh sanctions imposed by the gov-
ernment, the victim has the right to sue the Bad Samaritan to get a private
remedy.205  However, causation and fairness issues complicate the desira-
bility of a private remedy.  The harm a victim suffered might have been
caused by his or her own carelessness, an act of nature, or the wrongdoing
of a third party,206 while in most cases the causal link between a
bystander’s failure to rescue and the victim’s harm is tenuous.  Therefore,
“forcing a nonrescuer to compensate a victim may be unfair” in such
situations.207
2. Immunity Clause
Besides enforcing a duty to rescue, a Chinese Good Samaritan law
should also provide immunity to Good Samaritans under certain circum-
stances.  Since the Peng Yu case and Xu Yunhe case, people have been hesi-
tant to help injured strangers because they fear consequential legal
liability.  Thus, any Good Samaritan statute, if adopted, should set clear
guidelines defining immunity and stating when the statute applies.  How-
ever, the immunity clause should not sacrifice the overall statute’s goal of
encouraging people to be Good Samaritans.
a. Standard of Care
As discussed in Part I, existing statutes adopt one of three levels for the
standard of care necessary for an individual to be eligible for immunity.208
The first level only requires that the rescuer have acted in good faith, and
this level could do most to encourage Good Samaritan behaviors.209  The
second level extends immunity to rescuers unless the rescuers’ acts consti-
tute gross negligence,210 and the third level provides no immunity for a
rescuer whose act is “negligent,” offering no additional immunity beyond
what is available under common law’s reasonableness standard.211
203. See Edward A. Tomlinson, The French Experience with Duty to Rescue: A Dubious
Case For Criminal Enforcement, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 453 (2000).
204. Schiff, supra note 80, at 104– 05. R
205. Id. Such cause of action is based on tort law theories, as failure to rescue is a
“simple tort action” and is “in itself unreasonable.” Id.
206. Silver, supra note 175, at 438– 39. R
207. Id. at 438.
208. See discussion supra Part I.D.3.b.
209. See Sutton, supra note 126, at 282. R
210. See Frieder, supra note 128, at 50. R
211. See Sutton, supra note 126, at 286. R
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“Good faith” is usually not an appropriate standard because it sets
almost no boundary to limit the rescuer’s action.  Also, “good faith” as a
mental state is difficult to prove.  Some scholars assert that the standard of
care should be “reasonable assistance” (level three) because courts usually
consider reasonableness “in light of all circumstances,” and would take
into account “the fact that even the most prudent rescuer would be forced
to make hasty decisions in an emergency.”212  Scholars also argue that tort
law has firmly established reasonable care as the normal standard of
behavior, and to require less may “encourage carelessness.”213  However,
the reasonableness standard is no different from that of regular tort liabil-
ity and such immunity statutes add little additional value for the rescu-
ers.214  In the context of Chinese society, the purpose of adopting a Good
Samaritan statute is to encourage both certain medically trained persons
and laypersons to render aid in emergency situations.  Holding rescuers to
the ordinary negligence standard while requiring them to render aid seems
unfair.215
With the aim to maximize Good Samaritan behavior, China should
adopt an immunity clause with a standard of care below the negligence
standard.  The Chinese and American tort law systems function in a similar
way.  Although the Chinese Tort Liability Law does not define negligence, a
prevailing argument is that “negligence is a conduct that violates a duty of
care that a reasonable person should normally exercise.”216  Furthermore,
the Chinese Tort Liability Law defines a reasonable person’s duty of care as
“the level of care most people would have [adopted] under the same cir-
cumstance;” such definition is almost identical to the “reasonableness”
concept in American tort law.217  The Chinese Tort Liability Law also
divides negligence into “general negligence and gross negligence” depend-
ing on the degree of severity.218  Normally, if a person has “also failed to
reach the minimum level of care a regular person should have exercised,
that person is found to be grossly negligent.”219
However, the Chinese Tort Liability Law only applies the concept of
gross negligence to contributory negligence situations, where “the defen-
dant’s liability may be reduced because” of the gross negligence of the
plaintiff.220  In this legal system where gross negligence is applied within a
212. See Silver, supra note 175, at 441– 42. R
213. Id. at 442.
214. Sutton, supra note 126, at 286 (“[Statutes] that merely provide for immunity if R
the acts of the rescuer are not ‘negligent’ . . . change[ ] nothing from common law tort
liability and appear[ ] to make these statutes of no value for the rescuer at all.”).
215. See Silver, supra note 175, at 442. R
216. Mo Zhang, supra note 150, at 435. R
217. See id. at 435– 36.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.; see also Chinese Tort Liability Law art. 78.  Under Article 78, “where a
domestic animal causes harm to another person, the keeper or manager of the animal
shall assume the tort liability, but may assume no liability or reduced liability if it can be
proved that the harm is caused by the victim intentionally or by the gross negligence of
the victim.” Id. (citing the original text, which indicates
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very limited scope, promoting a Good Samaritan law based on a standard
of care of gross negligence will be a big step.  However, the key issue of
China’s Bad Samaritan problems is that people are afraid of the legal con-
sequences of helping strangers.  A Good Samaritan law, if enacted in
China, has to serve the functions of relieving people from the bad influence
of the Peng Yu Case and relieving people from the concern of unexpected
legal liability.  Therefore, the Chinese Good Samaritan law should adopt
“gross negligence” as the standard of care to immunize rescuers from legal
liabilities.
b. Class of People Protected
As discussed in Part I, existing Good Samaritan laws differentiate
between the classes of people to whom they give immunity.  Some states’
Good Samaritan laws extend immunity to any person who stops and ren-
ders aid,221 while other states only provide immunity to people who are
qualified, such as physicians and lifeguards.222  These states only give
immunity to people with qualifications because physicians and other quali-
fied persons are usually best trained to give an injured person immediate
and appropriate assistance.223  Additionally, the victims can always sue the
physicians for malpractice in cases where assistance leads to a bad
outcome.224
The conditions are different in China.  The purpose of the law is to
maximize people’s motivation to save injured strangers on the road.  If the
law only gives immunity to qualified medical workers, laypeople will con-
tinue to be indifferent because the law will still not protect them.  A Good
Samaritan statute should set clearer guidelines to address this problem.
For example, despite extending immunity to all citizens, the statute should
not provide immunity to rescuers who perform sophisticated medical treat-
ment but do not have any related qualifications.  The statute will treat mis-
takes arising from such actions as “gross negligence.”  On the other hand,
additional immunity might be given to qualified medical workers, as their
expertise and experience could be very helpful in rendering first aid or
emergency care.225
C. The Newly Enacted Good Samaritan Statute in Shenzhen
In 2011, Shenzhen, a major Chinese city, proposed the country’s first
Good Samaritan law to encourage its residents to assist people in dan-
“
”) (emphasis
added).
221. See Sutton, supra note 126, at 276. R
222. Id.
223. Id. at 292.
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 142– 143 and accompanying text; see e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-332(a) R
(2006) (“When any doctor of medicine or dentistry, [or] nurse . . . renders first aid or
emergency care a the scene of an accident . . . , he or she shall not be liable for any civil
damages as a result of his or her acts or omissions . . . .”).
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ger.226  The proposal first suggests that if the victim alleges that it was the
rescuer who caused the victim’s injury, the victim must provide sufficient
evidence to prove it; otherwise, the rescuer is not legally liable for any inju-
ries.227  Second, the proposal suggests that if the rescuer exercises his “reg-
ular duty of care,” then the rescuer is not legally responsible for the
outcome of the rescue.228  The victim must provide evidence to prove that
the rescuer did not exercise his “regular duty of care” in order to hold the
rescuer liable for anything.229  Third, the proposal suggests that the gov-
ernment reward the rescuers and impose criminal liability on victims who
hide the truth and falsely accuse rescuers of being responsible for their
injuries.230  Further, the government proposes to award witnesses who
stand up to tell the truth when there is conflicting information about the
rescue.231
This proposal is a great example of an appropriate Good Samaritan
law for Chinese society.  It covers the problems of burden of proof and
immunity.  More importantly, this proposal employs a mixture of “sticks
and carrots.”  It directly addresses the problems of the Peng Yu and Xu
Yunhe Cases— by imposing criminal liability on victims who falsely accuse
rescuers of being responsible for their injuries, and by rewarding the rescu-
ers and the witnesses who are brave enough to tell the truth.  Shenzhen put
into effect this proposal on August 1, 2013,232 and hopefully, similar stat-
utes will be implemented throughout China.
Conclusion
The incident of Yue Yue, during which bystanders showed indifference
to a little girl seriously injured on the road, focused the world’s attention
on China’s Good Samaritan problem.  To solve this problem, first the Chi-
nese legal system must face the defects in the reasoning of the Peng Yu and
Xu Yunhe Cases.  In situations where victims allege that their rescuers
caused the victims’ injuries, the victims should have the burden of proof
and the obligation to provide actual evidence to prove their rescuers’
liability.
Second, China must learn from European and American jurisdictions
to adopt effective Good Samaritan laws.  Considering the lowered sense of
226. See Tania Branigan, Chinese City Poised to Introduce Country’s First Good Samari-
tan Rules, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2011, 11:53 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2011/nov/30/china-good-samaritan-rules-shenzhen.
227. Shenzhen Proposed to Introduce Good Samaritan Rules, and Award Witnesses Who
Stand Up To Tell The Truth ( ), TENCENT
NEWS (Jan. 12, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://news.qq.com/a/20130112/000835.htm.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Shenzhen Shou Ban “Lei Feng Fa” Zhu Ren Wei Le Xingwei Shou Mianze Baohu
( ) [Shenzhen Implemented “Lei Feng Law”
Good Samaritan Behaviors Will be Protected], WEIHAI NEWS ( ) (Oct. 30, 2013,
8:57 AM), http://www.whnews.cn/news/node/2013-10/30/content_5831779.htm.
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morality in Chinese society after the infamous Peng Yu case, China’s Good
Samaritan law must enforce a duty to rescue and have a broad immunity
clause.  Finally, Shenzhen’s newly proposed Good Samaritan statute raises
another good plan to help solve the Good Samaritan problem in China.  A
mixture of “stick and carrots”— punishing victims who falsely accuse their
rescuers and rewarding both rescuers and witnesses who tell the truth— will
deter victims from making false accusations and encourage more Good
Samaritan behavior in Chinese society.
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